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Abstract
We assess the role that monetary policy plays in the decision to default using a General Equi-
librium model with collateralized loans, trade in fiat money and production. The monetary
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operations. The value of collateral depends on traditional monetary policy and agents can op-
timally choose to default depending on the relative value of the collateral to the face value of
the loan. Default results in foreclosure, higher borrowing costs, inefficient investment and a
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 has renewed the interest in the ability of monetary policy
to mitigate the adverse consequences that financial frictions can have on real economic ac-
tivity. Mishkin (2009) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) argue that accommodative monetary
policy is helpful during financial crisis episodes. This paper takes a step back and examines
whether pre-crisis contractionary monetary policy can increase the likelihood that a crisis
occurs in the future and, if yes, what are its real effects.
Our model can succinctly nest competing visions of the causes of the Great Depression
(and of similar episodes) where debt-deflation dynamics act as an amplification mecha-
nism.1 On the one hand, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) find a high positive correlation
between money supply and output and conclude that the decline in the money stock before
the Great Depression was a substantial factor for the subsequent deflation and decline in
GDP. On the other hand, Bernanke (1983) establishes that the Great Depression can be
better explained when one explicitly models the financial frictions, which can impede the
supply of credit to the real economy and, thus, GDP growth. Our analysis suggests that
monetary forces are capable of inducing debt-deflation dynamics, but only when they ex-
acerbate the underlying financial frictions, which in our model lead to default. Thus, we
propose a “debt-deflation" channel of monetary policy.
We examine the effects of monetary policy on total output within a framework of fully
flexible prices. The underlying friction is that we allow agents to (endogenously) default
on their long-term loan obligations. Thus, there is a need for collateral to back these loans.
In all other respects, we maintain all the structural characteristics of General Equilibrium
analysis, i.e. optimizing behavior, perfectly competitive markets and rational expectations.
We show how an adverse monetary shock in the present can lead to over-in-debtness and
1The origin of this view can be traced back to Fisher (1933). His analysis is based on two fundamental
conditions, over-indebtedness and deflation. He argued that over-indebtedness can precipitate deflation in
future periods and subsequently liquidation of collateralized debt and bankruptcy, which can lead to fire sales
suppressing the value of the collateral even further. Hence, the initial deflationary pressures are exacerbated
and they precipate to even higher default, and, ultimately, to lower output.
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future deflation that in some state of the world can result in default, collateral liquidation,
reallocation of capital and finally reduction in GDP. Market incompleteness is central to
our analysis, since agents cannot write comprehensive contracts and hedge the possibility of
default. We consider a two period economy populated by entrepreneurs, who both consume
and produce, and show under what conditions the system can move to a state which is
characterized by defaults on collateralized loan obligations. Agents engage into long-term
borrowing to buy the productive assets, which they pledge as collateral to secure their loan.
The decision to default is endogenous and depends on the difference between the value of
the collateral and the loan as in Geanakoplos (2003). We introduce money to emphasize
how a nominal shock, and not only a productivity or financial shock, can lead to financial
fragility and a reduction in GDP.
Our result can be summarized as follows. Consider the case where debt is fully col-
lateralized and entrepreneurs never default, since the nominal value of their contractual
obligation is less than the value of their pledged collateral. Assume also that there is an
adverse future state of the economy whereby the value of their debt is equal to the value
of their collateral, and, thus, the borrower is indifferent between default and fully repaying
his loan. In other words, he is on-the-verge of defaulting. Any further adverse shock in the
economy that reduces further the value of his collateral will inevitably provide him with
an incentive to default, since the benefit from defaulting will exceed its cost. In such a
situation, the impact of the real economy becomes evident. When the entrepreneur defaults
he loses the capital asset he has pledged as collateral and, therefore, his production will
decrease. Subsequently, he needs to attract new capital in the market under more stringent
financial conditions. The upshot of the argument is that this process may lead to inefficient
production due to capital reallocation to firms that are not debt or liquidity constrained, yet
their marginal product of capital is lower. We refer the reader to Gilchrist et al. (2013) for
an empirical assessment of the magnitude of the loss in aggregate resources due to such
misallocation and for a review of the related literature.
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Our work relates to the strand of literature that argues that the financial crisis and in
particular defaults on financial contracts can lead to economic recessions. Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1999) model a credit constraint, arising from costly state
verification, whereby the firm is only able to obtain collateralized loans and the amount
of credit to the firm shrinks in the presence of deflationary pressures on the prices of its
assets. This introduces an external finance premium, which increases with a decrease in
the relative price of capital. In turn, an increase in the cost of capital will result in a
decrease in the marginal product and a reduction in GDP. Our paper differs because there
is no deadweight loss associated with default and capital misallocation is the mechanism
through which default affects output. Finally, our focus in on the debt-deflation pressures
of monetary policy.
Our approach is also related to the work on the debt deflation theory of Sudden Stops
(Mendoza (2006), Mendoza (2010), and Mendoza and Smith (2006)). These papers intro-
duce collateral constraints similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in an RBC model of a
Small Open Economy to show that when debt is sufficiently high, an adverse productivity
shock triggers the constraints and results in a fire-sales spiral, falling prices and a reduction
in output. Our results point to the same direction, though contrary to them we consider a
monetary economy with nominal contracts and focus on monetary shocks, which have not
been thoroughly studied in the literature. In addition, they do not allow for the possibil-
ity of default. The latter is crucial for our analysis, since it is the reason that capital gets
reallocated to result in inefficient production. Due to fully flexible nominal prices, mon-
etary policy only affects the price level in the final period and not the total output in the
absence of default.2 However, default makes credit conditions more adverse and capital is
not allocated efficiently.
We contribute to the aforementioned papers by studying the effect of nominal loan
contracts on the propagation of shocks and output. Importantly, Bernanke et al. (1999)
2Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) show that when prices are sticky, deleveraging and deflation will still
affect output due to a reduction in aggregate demand.
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focus on real contracts and argue that the modeling of nominal ones is an important step
for future research. In our work, nominal long-term loans play a crucial role, since their
face value is invariant to deflationary pressures, while the value of collateral that backs
them is not. Moreover, we explicitly examine how pre-crisis monetary policy affects the
probability of a crisis.
The paper closest to ours is Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) who introduce money through
cash-in-advance constraints in the real-economy model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and
study how monetary shocks interact with collateral constraints. They also show that money
contractions generate recessions, but for a different reason that ours. A monetary contrac-
tion reduces the value of collateral and tightens collateral constraints in Cordoba and Ripoll.
Although default (or equivalently a debt renegotiation) could mitigate the amplification ef-
fects of binding collateral constraints, we show that it results in a misallocation of capital
because financing costs rise for poor in capital entrepreneurs. Consequently, the monetary
authority should take into consideration the deflationary impact on collateral values when
it is choosing its monetary injections.
Our framework is rich enough to analyze productivity shocks as the cause of debt-
deflation. A number of papers model fire-sales due to adverse productivity or funding
shocks to capture debt-deflationary effects on asset prices leading to loss spirals and fi-
nancial instability.3 However, we choose to focus on the monetary channel, since it is the
least explored in the literature. In our model, default on the collateralized loan due to a fall
in the value of collateral, exacerbates the debt-deflation dynamics leading to further price
declines. Agents do not face additional borrowing constraints and the drop in output is due
to an inefficient reallocation of capital. The introduction of funding constraints as in the
papers above, would exacerbate the channel that we describe.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, while section
3 discusses the equilibrium. Section 4 describes how monetary policy can cause default
3For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008),
Lorenzoni (2008), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Adrian and Shin (2009), Korinek (2011).
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and how the latter results in higher borrowing costs, capital reallocation and lower output.
Section 5 concludes. The proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We build a general equilibrium model where two types of agents interact to produce a
consumption good. Agents are considered to be entrepreneurs, who both produce and
consume the same good. Production happens through the utilization of another capital
good, from which agents derive no utility at any point in time. Nonetheless, its price will
be always positive in the beginning of every period, since it is essential for the production
of the consumption good from which agents derive utility. An important consequence of
default is the reallocation of resources. The agent that defaults loses the pledged collateral,
which is put for sale in the market. Heterogeneity is an important factor, since it is the
reallocation of collateral that results in lower aggregate output. In a general equilibrium
framework, the market for the capital good clears and all capital will be used for production.
Total output depends on the efficient use of capital, which means any additional unit should
end up to the agent with the higher marginal productivity. However, in the presence of
financing frictions capital may end up with the least productive agent, since he may not
face these frictions.
We assume that production takes time and receipts from the sale of goods are not im-
mediately available. This creates the need for a short term funding market, which bridges
the gap between expenditures and receipts from sales. Implicitly, agents cannot directly
trade the capital good against the subsequent production of the consumption good and they
cannot not write their own IOUs to facilitate these transactions. Instead, they need to hold
money, which is modeled as credit from the central bank, to transact in the capital and con-
sumption goods’ markets. The transaction demand for money motive naturally emerges
from the cash-in-advance constraint. Since capital is a durable good, in view of the in-
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herent moral hazard problem of honoring long-term debt obligation, agents are required
to pledge the capital they purchase as collateral. Finally, the introduction of uncertainty
is crucial, since under certainty there would be no default. Without loss of generality, we
allow for default in only some realizations in the future.
To sum up, our minimal modeling characteristics are agents’ heterogeneity, a consump-
tion and a durable capital good, a collateralized long-term loan and short-term loan markets,
flexible prices, a monetary economy, uncertainty and incomplete markets. Even though
complexity increases with the introduction of these characteristics, we are able to solve
the model in closed-form and derive analytical results for our thesis. We now describe the
model in a more rigorous manner.
2.1 The Economy
We consider a two-period monetary general equilibrium model with production, where
agents know the present (t = 0) but face an uncertain future (t = 1), when nature chooses
one of the states of the world s∈ S= {1,2} with probability pis. State 1 and 2 are otherwise
the same except that there is a lower short-term money supply by the central bank in state
2 than in state 1.4 Let S∗ = {0}∪ S be the set of all states. There are two goods in the
economy. Good 1 is a commodity and is perishable. Good 2 is a capital good and is durable.
Two heterogeneous agents, a and b trade these two goods. Agent a has an endowment
e ∈ R++ of the capital good at t = 0, while the poor agent b has zero endowment of the
capital good at every point in time. For simplicity, the capital does not depreciate. Agents
are not endowed with the commodity good, but rather use capital to produce it. Agents
obtain utility from consuming the commodity, while the capital has no consumption value
and is only used for production. Let xhs∗ be the consumption of commodity in state s
∗
4We can consider this as a monetary shock. This is the only source of uncertainty in the model. Alter-
natively, we could have distinguished the two states via a productivity shock. What matters is that there is
some fundamental uncertainty between the two states, thus our results would be qualitatively the same under
a productive shock as well.
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by agent h ∈ H = {a,b}. To derive closed form results, we assume a logarithmic utility
function υ(xhs∗) = ln(x
h
s∗) : R+→ R,∀s∗ ∈ S∗,h ∈ H. Let yhs∗2 be the capital good held by
agent h at the end of state s∗. Both agents have Cobb-Douglas production functions given
by Fhs∗(y
h
s∗2)=A
h
s∗(y
h
s∗2)
σ
: R+→R,∀s∗ ∈ S∗,h∈H, where Ahs∗ is the total factor productivity
and σ is the output elasticity of capital. Production takes place within each period.
2.2 Money, Short-term Money Markets, and Money Storage
Money in our model is the stipulated means of exchange and a store of value. We introduce
it through cash-in-advance constraints, such that an agent can purchase either the capital
or the commodity in the relevant markets only by paying in money. Although money is
fiat and has no intrinsic (consumption) value, it has value because it is essential for the
conduct of transactions in the goods’ markets. Agents cannot print their own money and
they have to borrow it from the Central Bank, which intervenes directly in the short-term
and long-term money markets. In particular, when the central bank purchases intra-period
bonds within each state of the world, it injects a quantity of money Ms∗,∀s∗ ∈ S∗ into the
system. Moreover, when the central bank extends a collateralized loan at t = 0, it injects
a quantity of money m¯ into the system.5 Money exits the system when agents repay their
short-term and long-term loan to the central bank. At the end of period 2 all money will
exit the system, since it has no consumption value for any agent.
For s∗ ∈ S∗, let µhs∗ be the amount of fiat money that agent h chooses to owe in the short-
term money market and rs∗ be the short-term interest rate. From market clearing, we have
that 1+ rs∗ =∑h∈Hµhs∗/Ms∗ . Thus, the ratio of nominal value of loans over the central
bank’s credit extension determines the gross nominal interest rate. The amount of fiat
5Collateralized long-term loan extension is not an unusual function of modern central banks especially in
the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis. Alternatively, one could think of government sponsored institutions,
which extend collateralized loans, e.g. Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae in the case of mortgages. Abstracting
from a competitive optimizing banking sector allows us to focus on the effects of credit extension/money
supply by the central bank on default and output. However, by doing so we cannot derive conclusions about
financial fragility and the possibility of credit crunches, which issues are kept for further research.
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money that each agent h borrows is µhs∗/(1+ rs∗). Agents do not default in the short-term
money markets. since there is no uncertainty about their production within each period and
their short-term borrowing can be fully collateralized.
The only way for agents to transfer money across periods is through a money storage
technology, potentially offered by the central bank. Agent a may store d amount of money
in the beginning of t = 0 so that he will be able to use it at t = 1.6 We assume that the
money storage technology is only available at the beginning of t = 0, not in the end of
t = 0, though this assumption can be easily relaxed without affecting any of the results.
2.3 Commodity and capital good markets
Denote by ps∗1 the price of the commodity and ps∗2 the price of capital in s∗ ∈ S∗. These
are taken as given by both agents to maintain price-taking behavior. Let bhs∗1 and b
h
s∗2,
∀h∈H, be the amount of fiat money spent by agent h to trade in the commodity and capital
goods’ markets in state s∗ ∈ S∗. In addition, let qhs∗1 and qhs∗2 be the amount of commodity
and capital offered for sale in state s∗ ∈ S∗ by h. In equilibrium, at positive levels of trade,
0 < ps∗1 =∑h∈H bhs∗1/∑h∈H qhs∗1 < ∞, and 0 < ps∗2 =∑h∈H bhs∗2/∑h∈H qhs∗2 < ∞. Note
that agents cannot sell commodities or capital goods they do not own.
The amount of capital good held by agent a at the end of t = 0 is ya02 = e− qa02, while
in state s it is yas2 = e−qa02−qas2.7 The amount of capital good held by agent b at the end
of t = 0 is yb02 = b
b
02/p02, while in state s agent b
′s final holdings depend on whether he
defaults on the collateralized loan or not, which is discussed in the following section.
As mentioned, all transactions are intermediated through the use of fiat money, i.e. the
proceeds from commodity sales in state s∗ cannot be used to purchase the capital good
6In our model only agent a stores money intertemporally. However, the arrangement described here
applies to agent b as well; the same goes for the next section where we only describe agent b taking out a
collateralized loan.
7We have modeled agent a selling the capital good in both periods. In the initial period, this is always true
since he is the only one endowed with it. However, it may well be the case that he buys back some capital in
the second period. If this was the case qas2 would be negative and the cash-in-advance constraints would need
to be adjusted accordingly. Note that this does not affect the results of our thesis.
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directly, and vice versa. This institutional arrangement is a fundamental feature of a model
that captures the importance of liquidity constraints and generates a transaction demand
for fiat money. We have chosen to introduce money in our model through cash-in-advance
constraints as it is methodologically convenient and captures the way goods prices are
determined through the Quantity Theory of Money (QTM), whereby both prices and quan-
tities are affected when monetary variables change.8 Cash-in-advance constraints should
be viewed as liquidity constraints that distinguish goods from liquid wealth.
An alternative way to introduce a demand for money, is by incorporating money bal-
ances in the utility and production function. Stein (2012) considers such a model where
banks engage in money creation and show that this can lead to financial instability due to
fire-sales. When banks try to retain the riskless character of their IOUs, they will need
to liquidate a part of their portfolio in bad realizations. Although in his model prices are
flexible, monetary policy can play a role through controlling money creation. The reason is
that money enters as an input in the objective function of both households and firms func-
tion. In our framework, the only role for money aggregates is to determine the price level
of goods through the QTM. A change in the quantity of money will have no real effect on
output in the final period if agents choose not to default on their long-term obligations. The
only effect would be an adjustment in prices, since prices are fully flexible. However, the
money stock in the initial period affects the investment decision by agent b. This is another
financing friction due to the fact that the long-term loan needs to be backed by collateral.
Given the scarcity of collateral, a change in M0 will affect investment decisions. Monetary
policy has real effects, when deflationary pressures due to a lower money supply induces
agents to default after a certain point, which results in a reallocation of resources.9 We call
8The methodology is close to Dubey and Geanakoplos (2006), Tsomocos (2003) and Goodhart et al.
(2006), who introduce cash-in-advance constraints to examine the interaction between liquidity and default
and analyze financial stability. However, only Goodhart et al. (2010) examine the interaction between money
and collateral values in the case of mortgages.
9An advantage of our model is that it yields closed-from results. Hence, we are able to identify clearly
the propagation mechanism and present the unfolding of events, through which monetary policy affects the
decision to default and subsequently the allocation of capital and total output. To that extent we do not engage
in a detailed discussion of optimal monetary policy, but rather propose default as an additional channel for
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this the debt deflation channel of monetary policy, which is described in detail in section 4.
We discuss the endogenous decision of agents to default in the following section. Recapit-
ulatively, our debt deflation channel is initiated via positive default, thus emphasizing the
important interconnection of liquidity and default. Consequently, the externality induced
by positive default leads to inefficient capital allocation and investment in the economy.
2.4 Default and Collateralized Loan Market
In the initial period, agent b finances his investment in the capital good both through short-
term and collateralized borrowing. When he borrows from the collateralized loan market,10
he pledges the capital purchased as collateral. In the second period, the borrower either
delivers in full the amount of the collateralized loan or defaults. In the case of default,
the collateral pledged is foreclosed and is put for sale in the secondary capital market.
The receipts are transferred to the central bank and determine the effective return on the
collateralized loan.
Formally, at t = 0, agent b takes out a collateralized loan to finance the purchase of
the capital good. The interest rate is r¯ and he promises to payback µ¯ in the next period.
The collateralized loan extension is therefore m¯ = µ¯/(1+ r¯), since the credit extension
is m¯. He spends bb02 ≤ µ¯/(1+ r¯)+ µb0/(1+ r0)11 amount of money to purchase bb02/p02
amount of the capital good, which he then pledges as collateral. We denote by C the
amount of collateral pledged in terms of units of the capital good, i.e. C = bb02/p02. Thus
the collateralized loan is defined by both the interest rate and the collateral requirement.
At t = 1, the agent will deliver min(µ¯, ps2C). If ps2C ≥ µ¯, then agent b does not default
affecting aggregate output.
10As mentioned the price of the capital good will be higher than the the proceeds for goods sales, since it
is durable and can be used for production in the second period as well. Thus, agent b will partially finance his
capital good’s purchases through short-term borrowing or equivalently his income from goods sales within
the same period, and partially through a long-term loan agreement.
11The ratio
µb0/(1+ r0)
bb02
determines the margin on the collateralized loan, i.e. how much individual re-
sources agent b has to utilize to purchase the capital good. The lower the margin, the easier for the agent to
purchase capital by using it as collateral.
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on the collateralized loan and delivers the full amount µ¯. This is not a naive assumption.
Due to our General Equilibrium framework every contract is priced in equilibrium. When
equilibrium prices are such that the value of the collateral in the future is less than the
amount the agent has to repay, he would rather default, purchase the same amount of capital
from the secondary market and be better off.12 Default is an endogenous decision stemming
from utility optimization. Only when equilibrium prices are such that the value of the
collateral is higher than the nominal value of the loan will the agent repay fully. This is
the debt deflation channel through which monetary policy and money supply matter for the
determination of asset prices and they affect the decision to default and aggregate output,
which is analyze thoroughly in section 4.
Moreover, agent b spends an additional amount of money bbs2 in the capital market at
t=1, which brings his final capital good’s holdings to ybs2 = b
b
02/p02 + b
b
s2/ps2.
13 When
ps2C < µ¯, the borrower will give up the collateral C, which is then sold on the market for
ps2C. He will then spend bbs2 to purchase the capital good and his holding is y
b
s2 = b
b
s2/ps2.
2.5 Time-structure of the markets
At t = 0, the short-term (intra-period) money and collateralized loan markets open. Then
the commodity and capital good markets meet. Agents produce within the period. Settle-
ments of short-term loans occur at the end of each period. Finally, consumption takes place.
The same market activities take place at t = 1 in all the states and in addition agent b repays
the collateralized loans or alternatively defaults and the pledged collateral is foreclosed.
Figure 1 indicates the time line, including the moments at which the various markets
meet. We make the sequence precise when we formally describe the budget sets.
12An implicit assumption is that the agent is not further penalized for defaulting apart from losing the cap-
ital good his owns. Given that there is additional punishment, the wedge between the loan and the collateral
value has to be higher for him to default. Such an assumption only adds complexity and does not alter the
mechanism through which money supply affects the decision to default.
13In principle, the agent may choose to sell some of the capital good he owns in the second period. In this
case, bbs2 is negative and the cash-in-advance constraints need to be adjusted accordingly. Again this does not
affect the results of our thesis.
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Figure 1: Time Structure
2.6 Budget sets
Denote the macro variables which are determined in equilibrium, and which every agent
regards as fixed, by η = (p,r, r¯) ∈ R2S∗+ ×RS
∗
+ ×R+. Denote σa ∈∑a(η), where σa =
(xa,ba,qa,µa,d)∈RS∗+ ×RS
∗
+ ×RS
∗
+ ×RS
∗
+ ×R+ and σb ∈∑b(η), where σb =(xb,bb,qb,µb, µ¯)∈
RS
∗
+ ×RS
∗
+ ×RS
∗
+ ×RS
∗
+ ×R+ the vectors of agent a and b’s market decisions. Agent a’s op-
timization problem is as follows
max
σa∈∑a
Ua = ln(xa0)+∑
s∈S
pisln(xas )
s.t.Ba(η) = {σa ∈∑a(η) : (01a)− (s3a)}
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where:
(01a) ba01+d ≤
µa0
1+ r0
(02a) µa0 ≤ p02qa02
(03a) xa0 = A
a
0(y
a
02)
σ+ba01/p01
(s1a) bas1 ≤
µas
1+ rs
+d
(s2a) µas ≤ ps2qas2
(s3a) xas = A
a
s (y
a
s2)
σ+bas1/ps1
Also, ya02 = e− qa02 and yas2 = e− qa02− qas2 represent the capital owned by agent a in the
end of each period respectively, as discussed in section 2.3. Note that agent a cannot sell
more of the capital than what he initially owns, i.e. qa02 < e and q
a
s2 < y
a
02.
(01a) says that in the beginning of t = 0, agent a borrows short-term to purchase com-
modities and deposits the rest. (02a) says that in the end of t = 0, agent a repays the
short-term loan using the proceeds of capital sales. (s1a) says that in the beginning of each
state s ∈ S, agent a uses the deposits and short-term borrowing to purchase the commodity.
(s2a) says that in the end of each state s ∈ S, agent a repays the short-term loan using the
proceeds of capital sales. (03a) and (s3a) say that agent a’s consumption at the end of every
period is equal to what he produces plus the (net) purchases of the commodity.
Agent b’s optimization problem is as follows:
max
σb∈∑b
Ub = ln(xb0)+∑
s∈S
pisln(xbs )
s.t.Bb(η) = {σb ∈∑b(η) : (01b)− (s3b)}
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where:
(01b) bb02 ≤
µb0
1+ r0
+
µ¯
1+ r¯
(02b) µb0 ≤ p01qb01
(03b) xb0 = A
b
0(y
b
02)
σ−qb01
(04b) C =
bb02
p02
(s1b) µ¯+bbs2 ≤
µbs
1+ rs
if b does not default in state s
(s1b) bbs2 ≤
µbs
1+ rs
if b defaults in state s
(s2b) µbs ≤ ps1qbs1
(s3b) xbs = A
b
s (y
b
s2)
σ−qbs1
The capital owned by agent b and used for the production withing each period is yb02 =
bb02/p02 at t = 0, y
b
s2 = b
b
02/p02+b
b
s2/ps2 in state s if b does not default and y
b
s2 = b
b
s2/ps2
in state s if b chooses to default.
(01b) says that in the beginning of t = 0, agent b enters both a short-term and a col-
lateralized loan to purchase the capital good. (02b) says that in the end of t = 0, agent b
repays the short-term loan using the proceeds of commodity sales. (04b) says that agent b
puts all the capital good it bought as collateral for the intertemporal loan. (s1b) says that
in the beginning of each state s ∈ S, agent b borrows short-term to purchase more of the
capital good and also to repay the collateralized loan if he chooses not to default. If he
chooses to default, he does not repay the collateralized loan and uses the money borrowed
short-term only to purchase capital, since the capital he owned has been seized and put for
sale. (s2b) says that in the end of each state s ∈ S, agent b repays the short-term loan using
the proceeds of the commodity sales. (03b) and (s3b) say that agent b’s consumption at the
end of every period is equal to the amount of the commodity he produces minus what he
sells to repay his short-term loan.
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3 Equilibrium
We say that (η,(σh)h∈H) is a Monetary Collateral Equilibrium (MCE) for the economy iff:
i. ps∗1 =
bas∗1
qbs∗1
, ∀s∗ ∈ S∗
ii. p02 =
bb02
qa02
iii. ps2 =
bbs2
qas2
if b does not default in state s ∈ S
iv. ps2 =
bbs2
qas2+C
if b defaults in state s ∈ S
v. 1+ r¯ =
µ¯
m¯
vi. 1+ rs∗ =
∑h∈H µhs∗
Ms∗
∀s∗ ∈ S∗
vii. σh ∈ argmax
σh∈Bh(η)
Πh
Condition (i) says that the commodity market clears. Conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv) say
that the capital good markets clear for all s∗ ∈ S∗. Condition (v) says that the collateralized
loan market clears. Condition (vi) says that the short-term money markets clear. Condition
(vii) says that both agents optimize. In sum, all markets clear, expectations are rational, i.e.
future prices and interest rates are correctly anticipated, and agents optimize given their
budget sets.
Since agent b is not endowed with capital and agent a has a decreasing returns to scale
production function, there will always exist gains from trade. Thus, agent a will sell part
of his capital endowment to b and subsequently buy back some of b’s output. We refer
the interested reader to Geanakoplos and Zame (2013) for details about the existence of
equilibrium.
Hereafter, we analyze two types of equilibria: an equilibrium where there is no default
in any state, and an equilibrium where there is default on the collateralized loan in one state
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in the second period. We show that there is a threshold such that the former equilibrium
obtains if the money supply at t=0 is higher than the threshold, while the latter obtains
otherwise. We consider that the budget constraints of agents are always binding in equilib-
rium, i.e., agents do not hold idle cash within each period. To guarantee this, we postulate
that there is an infinitely small cost when agents hold money within each period, which
could be rationalized as the fee of maintaining checking accounts. Hence, agents will use
all the borrowed funds to trade in the goods’ markets and the budget constraints Bh(η) are
always binding.
4 Debt Deflation Channel of Monetary Policy
Our objective is to analyze the interaction between debt-deflation dynamics, monetary pol-
icy and real economic activity. Given that we abstract from any other financial frictions
apart from default and since prices are flexible, for the most part monetary policy will only
affect the general price level, while production will be efficient if there is no default. How-
ever, capital will be misallocated and production will be inefficient when default occurs.
We, thus, proceed with our analysis in two steps. First, we show the connection among the
level of interest rates, production and default (section 4.1). Second, we show how pre-crisis
contractionary monetary policy can lead to debt-deflation dynamics and eventually default
in the future (section 4.2).
Below we discuss two fundamental properties of our model, which are the determina-
tion of interest rates and of the price level. We, then, proceed to prove the aforementioned
claims.
Money is exchanged for the acquisition of capital and commodities, while receipts from
sales are used to pay back loans and possibly transfer wealth from one period to the other.
Since money does not enter into the utility function, agents will not hold money idle in
the end. All available liquidity will be channeled in the capital and commodity markets at
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t = 1. This means that all the central bank money supply (i.e. M0,M1,M2, m¯) would exit the
system via short-term and collateralized loan repayments. This is captured by proposition
4.1.
Proposition 4.1. Term Structure of Interest Rates. At t = 0, the aggregate money that
exits the system is equal to the short-term loan repayment at t = 0 plus any precautionary
saving, while the aggregate money that enters the system is equal to the collateralized
loan extension by the central bank plus the short-term loan credit extension. At t = 1,
the aggregate money that exits the system is equal to the repayment on the short-term
and collateralized loans, while the aggregate money that enters the system is equal to the
precautionary savings plus the short-term loan extension. Thus,
(4.11) M0r0+d = m¯
(4.12) M1r1+min[p12C, µ¯] = d
(4.13) M2r2+min[p22C, µ¯] = d
The above proposition shows that the liquidity provision by the central bank and the
default decision by agent b may produce an intricate relationship among interest rates.
Two important aims of our paper are to examine how liquidity and default affect interest
rates, and how aggregate output fluctuates with interest rate levels.14
Nevertheless, our thesis suggests that not only the interest rate, but also the quantity of
money are important for the determination of the price and output levels. The quantity the-
ory of money (Proposition 4.2) provides the intuition for the result. Reducing the quantity
of money at t=0 does not only affect prices, but also quantities sold, since it has an effect
on the ability of the poor in capital agent to leverage up and purchase capital (unlike the
representative agent’s sell-all assumption). This, in turn, affects the price of capital in the
14We consider liquidity to be the ability to borrow in the short-term loan markets. When the interest rate is
higher, it is more costly to borrow money and liquidity is lower.
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second period, since the quantity sold will depend on the stock of the durable good that
agents hold from the previous period.
Proposition 4.2. Quantity Theory of Money Proposition. In a MCE, the aggregate income
at t = 0, namely the value of all capital good and commodity sales, is equal to the sum of
total short-term credit and collateralized loan extension provided by the central bank minus
the precautionary savings. In state s at t = 1, if agent b does not default, aggregate income
equals the sum of total short-term central bank money supply and of precautionary savings
minus the collateralized loan repayment. If agent b defaults, aggregate income equals the
sum of total short-term central bank money supply and of precautionary savings. The QTM
holds for each point in time. In particular,
period 0,
p01qb01+ p02q
a
02 = M0+ m¯−d
period 1,
if agent b does not default in state s:
ps1qbs1+ ps2q
a
s2 = Ms+d− µ¯
if agent b defaults in state s:
ps1qbs1+ ps2(q
a
s2+C) = Ms+d
4.1 Interest Rates and Production
In this section we show how individual levels of production vary with the interest rate
level (Lemma 4.1) and finally how the latter affects the allocation of capital and aggregate
output (Proposition 4.3). We then distinguish between the default and no default cases.
Proposition 4.4 solves for the interest rate in the case of no default, whereas proposition 4.6
corresponds to the case where default is present in equilibrium. When there is no default,
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production will be efficient/optimal in the last period (Proposition 4.5). Production will not
be optimal at t=0 and will depend on the available liquidity at that point in time, i.e. M0.
It is the credit friction of collateralized loans that allows this relationship to exists. When
agent b chooses to default, capital gets reallocated and production seizes to be optimal even
in the last period. This inefficiency of default is shown in proposition 4.7. The inefficiency
stems from a change in interest rates, which creates a wedge between buying and selling
capital (Proposition 4.6). In section 4.2 we show how contractionary monetary policy can
create debt deflationary pressures in the value of collateral, which result in default in the
last period and a reduction in aggregate output.
In the following lemma, we formally examine the impact of interest rates on production.
The agent who demands the capital good will purchase it from the agent who is rich in it and
will finance his purchase partly with short-term credit. A change in the price of short-term
credit will have an impact on the trade of capital goods, thus it will affect the allocation of
the capital good and output.
Lemma 4.1. Relative prices, allocations and short-term interest rates. For agent b who
borrows in the short-term money market, purchases capital goods and sells commodities,
we have:
at t = 0
(4.11∗)
[ 1
xb0
Ab0σ(y
b
02)
σ−1
+pi1 1xb1
Ab1σ(y
b
12)
σ−1
+pi2 1xb2
Ab2σ(y
b
22)
σ−1
]
1
xb0
=
p02(1+ r0)
p01
at t = 1, ∀s ∈ S
(4.12∗)
1
xbs
Absσ(ybs2)
σ−1
1
xbs
=
ps2(1+ rs)
ps1
For agent a who borrows in the short-term money market, purchases commodities and sells
capital goods, we have:
at t = 0
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(4.13∗)
[
1
xa0
Aa0σ(y
a
02)
σ−1+pi1 1xa1 A
a
1σ(y
a
12)
σ−1+pi2 1xa2 A
a
2σ(y
a
22)
σ−1]
1
xa0
=
p02
p01(1+ r0)
at t = 1, ∀s ∈ S
(4.14∗)
1
xas
Aasσ(yas2)
σ−1
1
xas
=
ps2
ps1(1+ rs)
Equation (4.11∗) shows the trade-off between purchasing capital goods and selling com-
modities. The numerator of the LHS is the marginal utility of agent b from the use of the
durable capital to produce commodities. The denominator of the LHS is the marginal util-
ity of his consumption. The RHS is the relative price of the capital good and commodity,
including the interest rate wedge, since the purchase of the capital good is financed by
short-term borrowing and thus is costly. The same discussion follows for the other three
equations.
The above lemma 4.1 shows that interest rates have intricate effects on the allocation
of commodity and capital good, as well as production and final consumption. We are
particularly interested in how an interest rate variation affects the allocation of capital and
total production, which is examined in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Interest Rate’s Redistribution Effect on Capital. At t = 1, there is an
interest rate wedge between the marginal productivity of agent a and agent b.
Absσ(ybs2)
σ−1
Aasσ(yas2)
σ−1 = (1+ rs)
2
The change of rs,s ∈ S is positively related to the change of yas2 and negatively related to
the change of ybs2.
Both agents produce using the capital good. Agent a, who is rich in it, does not need
to purchase any capital and thus avoids the financing cost. Agent b, who purchases capital,
borrows short-term and has to pay the financing cost. The interest rate acts as a wedge
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between the marginal productivities of the two agents. In other words, there is a financing
premium. When the interest rate increases, it is more expensive for agent b to purchase the
capital good. An increase in the marginal productivity of agent b is needed to compensate
for the higher financing cost, otherwise it would not be profitable to purchase an additional
unit. Due to a concave production function, this results in a lower capital input for agent
b. Since the total amount of the capital good is fixed in the economy, agent a will hold
more of it after an increase in the interest rate. Proposition 4.3 shows that an increase in the
interest rate in state s will redistribute capital from the (initial) buyer to the (initial) seller
due to the interest rate wedge between the marginal productivity of the seller and the buyer.
Hence, the level of the interest rate determines the allocation of capital. When agent
b does not default on his obligations, all interest rates are zero as shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.4. Interest Rates under no default. When agent b does not default on the
collateralized loan, the interest rates on short-term loans and the collateralized loan are
all equal to zero, i.e.rs∗ = 0,∀s∗ ∈ S∗ and r¯ = 0.
This proposition says that, if there is no default, all interest rates and the collateralized
loan rate are zero, even if the central bank alters the money supply. This is contradictory
with reality where money supply has an inverse relationship with interest rate. The intuition
is as follows. In the end of t = 0 both agents will repay all their short-term debts in full. In
the end of t = 1 both agents will repay all their short-term loans and the collateralized loan
fully. The total amount of repayment in the two periods, including principal and interest, is
M0(1+r0)+Ms(1+rs)+ m¯(1+ r¯). The total amount of money available for them to repay
(i.e. all the money available in the system) is equal to total amount of money supply injected
by the central bank, i.e. M0+Ms+ m¯. In the absence of default, only when all interest rates
and the collateralized loan rate are zero will the money available be sufficient for agents
to fulfill their obligations. Since they do not have monetary endowment themselves, the
only way possible to repay each loan is to pay back an amount exactly equal to what they
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borrowed.
Given that short-term interest rates are zero, we can conclude from proposition 4.3 that
production is efficient and total output is maximized in the last period.
Proposition 4.5. Optimal Production in the Absence of Default. If agent b does not
default on the collateralized loan, the production in the economy is optimized at t = 1.
Due to cash-in-advance constraints, agent b who is short in capital in period t = 1
needs to borrow short-term to finance additional purchases of capital. When there is no
default and the interest rate is zero, there is no financing cost and the economy allocates
capital efficiently. In other words, there is no interest rate wedge between the marginal
productivities in the last period. The marginal productivities of the two agents are therefore
the same, which results in optimal production and maximum aggregate output. Otherwise,
it is always welfare improving to transfer some of the capital from one agent to the other.
This is not the case in the initial period regardless of the zero interest rate wedge. As it will
be more obvious in section 4.2, the money stock at t=0 affects the quantity of the capital
good sold due to the financing friction introduced by the need for collateral.
We now turn to the determination of the interest rates under the presence of default and
show the inefficiency in production that default yields.
Proposition 4.6. Interest Rates Under Default. Consider an equilibrium in which agent
b defaults on the collateralized loan in state 2, but not in state 1. Then, the short-term
interest rate in state 2 is positive and equal to r2 =
m¯− p22C
M2
> 0, while the short-term
interest rates at t = 0 and in state 1, and the collateralized loan rate are all equal to zero,
i.e. r0 = 0, r1 = 1 and r¯ = 0.
We can see that when agent b defaults in state 2 (and does not do so in state 1), the
short-term interest rate is no longer zero. Agent b defaults and the collateral is foreclosed
and sold. The proceeds go to the central bank as a form of repayment. However, this
repayment is not in full, so there is some money left in the system. As we discussed
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above, in the end all money will exit the system, hence the extra money left in the system
will exit as an additional interest payment for the short-term credit provided by the central
bank. The intuition is that when agent b decides to default, the central bank cannot do
anything except foreclosing the collateral, which is less valuable than the full payment of
collateralized loan. To compensate for the money lost in the collateralized loan extension,
the central bank will charge a positive interest rate on the short-term credit as a penalty for
default. We now show the inefficiency that a positive interest rate brings in production due
to default.
Proposition 4.7. Suboptimal Production in the Presence of Default. When agent b de-
faults on the collateralized loan, production in the economy is not efficient.
We can see that after default, although all the capital good is still fully utilized, it is not
allocated in an optimal way. Due to a positive financing cost, capital is no longer allocated
efficiently. The positive interest rate acts as a wedge between the two agents’ marginal
productivities, so that agent a has a lower productivity than agent b, or agent b ends up
holding less capital good than agent a. It is welfare improving to transfer some capital
from agent a to agent b, since b has a higher marginal productivity. The total production in
the economy is reduced due to the inefficiency that default brings along.
4.2 Contractionary Monetary Policy and Default
In this section we study the endogenous decision to default and examine when agent b
decides to default on the collateralized loan. To simplify the proof and without loss of
generality, we let both states occur with equal probability (i.e. pi1 = pi2 = 1/2), and assume
Ahs∗ = 1,∀s∗ ∈ S∗,h∈H, σ= 0.3, e= 2, and Ms∗ > m¯,∀s∗ ∈ S∗. We first derive the necessary
conditions for agent b to default (lemma 4.2) and then show how contractionary monetary
policy can lead to this condition. Given the production inefficiency that default brings
along (Proposition 4.7), we prove the existence of a suboptimal equilibrium due to debt
deflationary pressures in proposition 4.8.
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Lemma 4.2. Default Condition. Consider an equilibrium where agent b does not default
on the collateralized loan. We say that he is on the verge of defaulting if qa02 =
2m¯
M2+ m¯
and
will start defaulting if qa02 <
2m¯
M2+ m¯
.
This lemma provides the equilibrium solution for the default condition that an agent
will default on the collateralized loan if the collateral is less valuable than the amount
of loan. It says that when the capital good sold by agent a in t = 0 (equivalent to the
capital good purchased by agent b in t = 0) is lower than a certain threshold specified
by the fundamentals of the economy, then agent b will default on the collateralized loan.
Answering the question whether monetary policy has an impact on the default decision
is equivalent to seeing whether there is a money supply such that qa02 is smaller than this
threshold. This is examined in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.8. Debt deflation channel of Monetary Policy. Consider an equilibrium
where agent b does not default on the collateralized loan. Then,
∂qa02
∂M0
> 0. Also, ∃M∗0 ,
such that qa02 =
2m¯
M2+ m¯
>
2m¯
M1+ m¯
and for M0 < M∗0 agent b starts defaulting in state 2.
Finally, default occurs due to debt deflationary pressures on the price of the collateral,
since p22 = bb22/(1− yb02) = (M2− m¯)/(2(1−qa02)) and
∂p22
∂M0
> 0.15
This proposition shows that in an initial equilibrium where agent b does not default in
either state, there is a positive relation between the money supply at t = 0 and qa02. When
the money supply at t = 0 is reduced, qa02 goes down as well. Also, there is a certain money
supply M∗0 at which q
a
02 reaches the default threshold in state 2, but not in state 1 where
there is a relatively higher money supply. In another words, agent b is on the verge of
default in state 2. This proposition says that a contractionary monetary policy in t = 0 will
lead agent b into default in state 2.
Since
∂qa02
∂M0
> 0, we can see that when the central bank reduces the money supply in
15In the appendix we show that there exists another equilibrium for which there does not exist an M∗0 such
that agent b is on the verge of defaulting. For this equilibrium, pre-crisis monetary policy cannot induce
debt-deflation dynamics leading to default and inefficient production in the future period.
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period t = 0, agent b purchases less capital. However, agent b will still borrow the same
amount of collateralized loan, m¯, extended by the central bank. Thus, the same amount of
collateralized loan is backed by less capital, or equivalently leverage is higher or the margin
is lower. Moreover, we can see that with a lower qa02, the price of the capital good in state s,
ps2 = bbs2/(1− yb02) = (M2− m¯)/(2(1−qa02)), is lower. To sum up, a lower money supply
in t = 0 leads to a lower qa02 and a lower ps2. Since the default decision in state s is given
by ps2C < m¯, which is equivalent to ps2qa02 < m¯, we can see that a lower M0 will drive
agent b closer to default. In fact, lemma 4.2 points out that when qa02 is reduced to a certain
point, it will lead agent b into default in state s. Proposition 4.8 shows that when the money
supply in t = 0 is lower, agent b is closer to default. When the money supply is reduced to
M∗0 , agent b is on the verge of defaulting in state 2, since q
a
02 = 2m¯/(M2+ m¯), but agent b
will still be away from default in state 1, since qa02 > 2m¯/(M1+ m¯). When the central bank
reduces the money supply even more, then agent b will start defaulting in state 2.
The above lemma 4.2 and proposition 4.8 show debt-deflation and default as monetary
phenomena: a lower circulation of money in the first period leads to debt-deflation in the
second period. We proxy the circulation of money with money supply. The debt-deflation
here means relative deflation, i.e. a lower ratio of collateral value to the corresponding loan
value. It shows that a decreasing money supply by the central bank in the first period leads
to a lower ratio of collateral value to the corresponding loan value in the second period
monotonically, i.e. there is a positive correlation between the money supply at t = 0 and
the ratio of collateral value to loan value at t = 1. The lower the money supply, the lower the
ratio of collateral value to loan value. We coined this term "relative deflation." The lemma
4.2 points out the condition for default. When a money supply is reduced to a certain
point, the ratio of collateral value to the loan value is equal to one. If the money supply is
reduced further, the value of the collateral is less than the loan value, and the agent finds it
profitable to default on the loan repayment. This is what we call a debt deflation channel
of monetary policy, since in the presence of default capital gets reallocated and aggregate
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output decreases.
5 Conclusion
We build a monetary general equilibrium model with collateral and production and have a
formal treatment of the Fisher debt-deflation effects of monetary policy. We see that the
usual propositions in a monetary general equilibrium model hold in this model, namely the
quantity theory of money and the term structure of interest rate. Since this is a model with
production, we also show that money and interest rates have an effect on total production
(real output). One important result of this model is that interest rates, which represent
the cost of financing, have a redistribution effect on investment. When the interest rate
is higher, then the capital good will be redistributed from more productive agents to less
productive ones.
We argue that Fisherian debt-deflation can be explained as a monetary phenomenon. We
examined how a negative shock in money supply in the initial period can lead to default
in the second period through over-indebtedness and deflation. It is straightforward that a
reduction in the money supply in the second period after the shock hits would result in
debt-deflation dynamics and default. On the contrary, we focus on the pre-crisis money
supply, presumably when the economy is on a stable path, and we advocate that future
default and collateral prices are not independent of current monetary policy. Following
Fisher, the two dominant diseases for debt-deflation is too-much debt (in our case high
leverage) and subsequent deflation. We show that when the central bank reduces the short-
term money supply in the first period, the leverage ratio in that period increases: the agent
still borrows the same amount of collateralized loan while put less amount of capital good
as collateral. Furthermore, when the initial money supply is reduced, we find that the
price of the collateral (i.e. the capital good) is lower in the second period. The higher
leverage and deflation are the lower ratio of collateral value to loan value becomes in the
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second period and this brings the agent closer to default. In fact, we find when the money
supply in the initial period is lower than a threshold level, agents will default. If initially
the agent does not default and the money supply is close to the threshold, then a small
negative money supply shock creates relative deflation and generates default. This suggests
that considerations about the price of durables used as collateral should be included in the
determination of policy apart from inflation and GDP growth. However, this does not have
to be a continuous target, but rather a binary objective monitoring the incentive of agents
to default on collateralized loans.
One would imagine that if an economy is at its potential output, then it would not matter
significantly whether or not there is default. However, this turns out not to be the case. In
our model, the other important result is that after default, the interest rate in state 2 increases
significantly, which results in a redistribution of capital good from the more productive firm
to the less productive one. The production in state 2 is reduced and deviates from optimal
production. These variations in interest rate, investment and output do not have significant
impact in an equilibrium without default. Note that agent’s default creates an externality
to the economy by driving the short-term interest rate up that finally results into output
contraction.
The upshot is that, given all the production factors are fully utilized after debt-deflation,
we still manage to show the reduction in production and the misallocation of resources.
That is, we allow agent b to bid for the capital good in the market. Alternatively, had we
put b into bankruptcy and forbid him from any further activities, then all the production
factor will be in the hand of agent a and the adverse effect on total production will be even
worse. This is where we differentiate ourselves from Fisher’s debt deflation theory. Recall,
in his 1933 paper, Fisher considered the extreme case when defaulters get into bankruptcy
after debt-deflation. This naturally leads to lower production since agents that default stop
producing altogether. However, in our model, we manage to show the inefficiency from
debt-deflation without forcing defaulters into bankruptcy. Here, all the production factors
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are still in use. The externality is that they are not used as optimally as previously. Indeed,
due to the higher financing cost, the poor in capital agent produces less than the initially
richer. Thus, deflation favors in a sense the "creditor" and harms the "debtor".
In sum, Fisher’s debt deflation argument crucially depends on both liquidity and default
as it is shown in proposition 4.8. It is precisely the interplay of liquidity and default that
activates the default channel that distorts optimal capital investments.
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Appendix
Proof to proposition 4.1
Proof. From the binding budget constraints (01a),(02a),(01b),(02b) and market clear con-
ditions p01 = ba01/q
b
01, p02 = b
b
02/q
a
02, 1+ r¯ = µ¯/m¯ and 1+ r0 = (µ
a
0 + µ
b
0)/M0, we have
M0r0 + d = m¯; In state s ∈ S, if µ¯ ≤ ps2C, then agent b does not default; from the bind-
ing budget constraints (s1a),(s2a),(s1b),(s2b) and market clear conditions ps1 = bas1/q
b
s1,
ps2 = bbs2/q
a
s2 and 1+rs =(µ
a
s +µ
b
s )/Ms, we have Msrs+ µ¯= d; if ps2C < µ¯, then agent b de-
faults; from the binding budget constraints (s1a),(s2a),(s1b),(s2b) and market clear condi-
tions ps1 = bas1/q
b
s1, ps2 = b
b
s2/(q
a
s2+C) and 1+rs = (µ
a
s +µ
b
s )/Ms, we have Msrs+ ps2C =
d. To sum up, we have Msrs+min[ps2C, µ¯] = d.
Proof to proposition 4.2
Proof. The equation for t = 0 comes from combiding the binding equation (01a) and (01b)
and market clear conditions p01 = ba01/q
b
01, p02 = b
b
02/q
a
02, 1+ r¯ = µ¯/m¯ and 1+ r0 = (µ
a
0+
µb0)/M0. The proof for the other two equations are on the same line.
Proof to lemma 4.1
Proof. Equation (4.11∗) comes from combining the first order conditions of agent b’s op-
timization problem w.r.t. bb02, µ
b
0 and q
b
01, we have :
λb01 =
1
p02
[
1
xb0
Ab0σ(y
b
02)
1−σ
+pi1
1
xb1
Ab1σ(y
b
12)
1−σ
+pi2
1
xb2
Ab2σ(y
b
22)
1−σ
]
,
1
xb0
= λb02 p01,
λb01
1+ r0
=
λb02 and . Likewise, we can get equations (4.12
∗), (4.13∗) and (4.14∗) from other first order
equations.
Proof to proposition 4.3
Proof. From the equations (4.12∗) and (4.14∗) , we have (Abs/A
a
s )(y
b
s2/y
a
s2)
1−σ = (1+ rs)2.
Because Abs/A
a
s is fixed and positive, when rs increases, we have y
b
s2/y
a
s2 reduces. Because
ybs2+ y
c
s2 = e, we have y
b
s2 increases and y
a
s2 decreases.
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Proof to proposition 4.4
Proof. Given that the short-term interest rates rs∗ ≥ 0,∀s∗ ∈ S∗ and the collateralized loan
rate r¯ ≥ 0. When agent b does not default on the collateralized loan in any state s ∈ S, then
there must be ps2C ≥ µ¯, with market clearing condition 1+ r¯ = µ¯/m¯, equations (4.12) and
(4.13) become
(4.41) M1r1+ m¯+ m¯r¯ = d
(4.42) M2r2+ m¯+ m¯r¯ = d
From (4.11), we can see d ≤ m¯ since otherwise M0r0 < 0. If d < m¯, then from (4.41), we
have m¯r¯+M1r1 = d− m¯ < 0, which contradicts with the fact tht r¯ ≥ 0 and r1 ≥ 0. So only
d¯ = m¯ is possible. Hence we have M0r0 = 0 and M1r1 + m¯r¯ = 0. With the nonnegative
interest rates, we can see that r0 = 0, r1 = 0 and r¯ = 0. The proof for r2 = 0 follows the
same line.
Proof to proposition 4.5
Proof. When agent b does not default, from proposition 4.3, we know that (Abs/A
a
s )(y
b
s2/y
a
s2)
1−σ=
1. We can see that (ybs2/y
a
s2)
1−σ = Aas/A
b
s . If the interest rate rs is not zero, let
ˆybs2 and
ˆyas2 be the capital good owned by agent b and a in state s respectively, then we have
( ˆybs2/ ˆy
a
s2)
1−σ = (Aas/A
b
s )(1+ rs)
2. We have ( ˆybs2/ ˆy
a
s2)
1−σ > (ybs2/y
a
s2)
1−σ. Thus we can see
( ˆybs2/ ˆy
a
s2)< (y
b
s2/y
a
s2). Since A
a
s =A
b
s , y
a
s2+y
b
s2 = e and ˆy
a
s2+
ˆybs2 = e, we have
ˆybs2 < y
b
s2 = e/2
and ˆyas2 > y
a
s2 = e/2. So when interest rate is positive, the capital good owned by agent b
is lower than the capital good owned by agent a, and the productivity of agent b is higher
than the productivity of agent a. We can always distribute some capital good from agent
a to agent b to achieve higher total production. When the interest rate is zero, we can see
that monetary policy, any of Ms∗,∀s∗ ∈ S∗ or m¯ or the combination of the above, has no
impact of the allocation of capital good in t = 1. The capital good is evenly allocated to the
two agents. Since the production function is concave, we can see that evenly distributed
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capitals good leads to the maximum production in the economy at t = 1.
Proof to proposition 4.6
Proof. The proof for r0 = 0, r1 = 0 and r¯ = 0 follow the proposition 4.4. Since agent b
defaults on the collateralized loan, with the market clear conditions 1+ r¯ = µ¯/m¯, we have
ps2C < µ¯b = m¯(1+ r¯) = m¯. From (4.13), we have M2r2 = d¯− ps2C > d¯− m¯= 0, so r2 > 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof to proposition 4.7
Proof. Follows the proof for proposition 4.5.
Proof to lemma 4.2
Proof. When agent b does not default, from proposition 4.4, we have rs∗ = 0,∀s∗ ∈ S∗
and r¯ = 0. From proposition 4.5, we have yas2 = y
b
s2 = 1. The capital good sold by
agent a in state s ∈ S is qas2 =
bbs2
ps2
= ybs2 − yb02 = 1− yb02. And with the binding bud-
get constraints, (s1a), (s2a), (s1b) and (s2b) and market clearing conditions:
bbs2
ps2
= qas2,
bas1
ps1
= qbs1,
µ¯b
1+ r¯
= m¯ and
µas +µ
b
s
1+ rs
= Ms, we have bbs2 = µ
a
s , b
a
s1 = µ
b
s , µ
b
s =
Ms+ m¯
2
,
µas =
Ms− m¯
2
. In state s, agent b will default on the collateralized loan in state s when
ps2C < µ¯. From the market clearing condition
bb02
p02
= qa02, we have C =
bb02
p02
= qa02. Hence
ps2C =
bbs2
qas2
qa02 =
Ms−m¯
2
1− yb02
qa02 =
Ms−m¯
2
1−qa02
qa02 < m¯, which is equivalent to q
a
02 ≤
2m¯
Ms+ m¯
.
Q.E.D.
We also derive here the following results which will be important below.
Since yas2 = y
b
s2 = 1, σ = 0.3, and Bs = 1, from equation (4.12
∗), we have
ps2
ps1
=
0.3(ys2)
−0.7 = 0.3, ∀s ∈ S, .
Since ps2 = (Ms− m¯)/[2(1−qa02)], we have ps1 = ps2/(ps2/ps1) =
Ms− m¯
0.6(1−qa02)
qbs1 =
µbs
ps1
= 0.3(1−qa02)
Ms+ m¯
Ms− m¯
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xas = (y
a
s2)
0.3+qbs1 = 1+0.3(1−qa02)
Ms+ m¯
Ms− m¯
xbs = (y
b
s2)
0.3
+qbs1 = 1−0.3(1−qa02)
Ms+ m¯
Ms− m¯
Proof to proposition 4.8
Proof. Step 1: from the first order conditions of agent b’s optimization problem w.r.t. µ¯,
bb02, µ
b
0 and q
b
01, we have:
λb01
1+ r¯
= λb03+λ
b
05,
λb01 =
1
p02
[
1
xb0
Ab0σ(y
b
02)
σ−1
+pi1
1
xb1
Ab1σ(y
b
12)
σ−1
+pi2
1
xb2
Ab2σ(y
b
22)
σ−1
]
λb01
1+ r0
= λb02
λb02 p01 =
1
xb0
From the first order conditions of agent b’s optimization problem w.r.t. µb1, q
b
1, µ
b
2 and q
b
2,
we have
λb03
(1+ r1)
= λb04
λb04 p11 = pi1
1
xb1
λb05
(1+ r2)
= λb06
λb06 p21 = pi2
1
xb2
Since rs∗ = 0,∀s∗ ∈ S∗, pi1 = pi2 = 12, σ= 0.3, and Bs∗ = 1,∀s
∗ ∈ S∗ We have
1
p01
1
xb0
=
1
2
1
p11
1
xb1
+
1
2
1
p21
1
xb2
1
p01
1
xb0
= 0.3
1
p02
[ 1
xb0
(qa02)
−0.7+
1
2
1
xb1
+
1
2
1
xb2
]
Let
k =
1
2
1
p11
1
xb1
+
1
2
1
p21
1
xb2
t = 0.3(
1
2
1
xb1
+
1
2
1
xb2
)
The above two equations become:
(4.81)
1
p01
1
xb0
= k
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(4.82)
1
p01
1
xb0
=
1
p02
[
0.3
1
xb0
(qa02)
−0.7+ t
]
Step 2: from the results that rs∗ = 0,∀s∗ ∈ S∗ and r¯ = 0, and the budget constraints and
market clearing conditions: µa0 = p02q
a
02, p02 =
bb02
qa02
, bb02 =
µb0
1+ r0
+
µ¯
1+ r¯
, 1+ r¯ =
µ¯
m¯
and
1+r0 =
µa0+µ
b
0
M0
, we have µa0 =
M0+ m¯
2
and µb0 =
M0− m¯
2
. We have pa02 =
µa0
qa02
=
(M0+ m¯)
2qa02
,
p01 =
µb0
qb01
=
(M0− m¯)
2qb01
and xb0 = (q
a
02)
0.3−qb01.
Step 3: substitute p01, p02 and xb0 into the two equations (4.81) and (4.82) in step 1.
We have
qb01 =
k(M0− m¯)(qa02)0.3
2+ k(M0− m¯)
qb01 =
0.3(qa02)
0.3+(qa02)
1.3t
(M0+ m¯)+qa02t(M0− m¯)
(M0− m¯)
Combine the above two, we have
(4.83) k[0.7M0+1.3m¯] = 0.6+2tqa02
Let J = [0.7M0+1.3m¯]
Step 4: substitute k and t into the equation (4.83) and simplify, and let h = 1−qa02, we
have a quadratic equations with one unknown,
(4.84) a1h2−a2h+a3 = 0
a1,a2 and a3 are all exogenous variables, where:
a1 =
(
(M1+ m¯)(M2+ m¯)0.32+
1
2
(M1− m¯)(M2+ m¯)0.3+ 12 (M2− m¯)(M1+ m¯)0.3+
+J
1
2
(M2+ m¯)0.3+ J
1
2
(M1+ m¯)0.3
)
a2 =
(
(M1+ m¯)(M2− m¯)0.3
(
1+
1
2
)
+(M1− m¯)(M2+ m¯)0.3
(
1+
1
2
)
+(M1− m¯)
(M2− m¯)+ J 12 (M2− m¯)+ J
1
2
(M1− m¯)
)
a3 = 2(M1− m¯)(M2− m¯)
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Step 5: We use Mathematica to solve the above equations and have two roots h1 and h2.
We want to check that there exists an M∗0 where 0 < q
a
02 =
2m¯
Ms+ m¯
< 1, which is equivalent
to 0< h= 1−qa02 =
(−m¯+M2)
(m¯+M2)
< 1, and
∂qa02
∂M0
> 0, which is equivalent to
∂h
∂M0
< 0, under
the restriction m¯ > 0, M0− m¯ > 0, M1− m¯ > 0, M2− m¯ > 0, and M1 > M2.
First, we take h1 and verify that h1 is positive. Also, there exist {m¯,M1,M0,M2} such
that h1 < 1. We then also verify that there exist {m¯,M1,M0,M2} such that 0 < h1 =
(−m¯+M2)
(m¯+M2)
< 1. Finally, we verify that
∂h1
∂M0
< 0.
Under the same restrictions, we can also verify that h2 is positive and there exists
{m¯,M1,M0,M2} such that h2 < 1. However, there does not exist {M1, m¯,M0,M2} such that
h2 =
(−m¯+M2)
(m¯+M2)
. Whatever h2 might be, agent b will never be on the verge of default.
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